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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant/Respondent ("Kmart") agrees with the Statement of Jurisdiction in the
Brief of Appellant Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT").
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Whether the trial court correctly held (i) that the plain language of Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-6-ll(l)(b) requires the trier of fact to separately assess and determine the
value of each and every separate interest in a property; and (ii) that this Court's holding
in State ex rel Rd. Cornm'n. v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975) ("Brown"), conflicts
with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(1 )(b) and would nullify the statute, if applied.
STANDARD OF RE VIEW
Kmart agrees with UDOT that this Court reviews the decision of the trial court for
correctness.
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are determinative:
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

1
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Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec, 22
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.

•

Utah Code Ann, § 78B-6-511
78B-6-511. Compensation and damages — How assessed.
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by any
of the parties to the proceedings, and determine and assess:
(1) (a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all
improvements pertaining to the realty;
(b) the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the
property; and
(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of
each estate or interest in each shall be separately assessed;
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff;
(3) if the property, though no part of it is taken, will be damaged by the
construction of the proposed improvement, and the amount of the damages;
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and
each estate or interest in it, will be benefitted, if at all, by the construction
of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit is equal to the
damages assessed under Subsection (2), the owner of the parcel shall be
allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; but if the
benefit is less than the damages assessed, the former shall be deducted from
the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition
to the value of the portion taken;
(5) if the property sought to be condemned consists of water rights or
part of a water delivery system or both, and the taking will cause present or
future damage to or impairment of the water delivery system not being
taken, including impairment of the system's carrying capacity, an amount to
compensate for the damage or impairment;
(6) if land on which crops are growing at the time of service of
summons is sought to be condemned, the value that those crops would have
had after being harvested, taking into account the expenses that would have
been incurred cultivating and harvesting the crops; and
(7) as far as practicable compensation shall be assessed for each source
of damages separately.

'

^

i

(

'

-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 29, 2010, UDOT filed this condemnation action ("Condemnation
Action") to condemn a deeded access easement (the "Access") from Bangerter Highway
to the West Point Shopping Center ("Shopping Center" or the "Shopping Center
Property"), located at the southwest corner of 5400 South St. and Bangerter Highway.
FPA owns the Shopping Center Property; Kmart operated a store in the Shopping Center
pursuant to a lease and a grant of easement.
By Order dated June 7, 2010, the trial court ordered occupancy of the Access. On
or about June 22, 2010, UDOT tore down the Access ramp and closed the Access. In
September 2010, FPA filed its Motion to Separate Just Compensation Determinations.
By Memorandum Decision, dated January 27, 2011, the trial court granted FPA's
Motion.
The trial court held that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-51 l(l)(b) "directs that the
assessment of compensation and damages in a condemnation be based on the 'value of
each and every separate estate or interest in the property . . .'" (R. 194.) The trial court
rejected the following assertion made by UDOT:
[The] applicable law is found not in § 78B-6-511(l)(b), but in [Brown],
which held that the "condemning authority is liable for the value of the land
taken and for severance damages to the land not taken, and it is from these
amounts that the lessee must receive any damages which it may have
sustained as a result of the taking."
(Id) (quoting Brown, 531 P.2d at 1295). Rather, the trial court "determine[d] that the
plain language of § 78B-6-51 l(l)(b) must be honored and that FPA be granted the
opportunity to have its interests valued separately from other interests in the subject
3
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property." (Id.) The court concluded that the language of subsection 51 l(l)(b) "is clear
and unambiguous and must therefore be regarded as conclusive." (R. 195.) Recognizing
that Brown conflicts with subsection 511(l)(b), the court held that "Brown must be
explained as simply opting to follow a valuation approach that is contrary to the one
selected by the Utah legislature, namely the valuation of each interest separately." (Id.)
The Condemnation Action remains in its early stages. FPA has not yet answered
the Complaint. The parties have not made their initial disclosures, have not had an initial
planning meeting, have not conducted discovery, and have not designated experts. The
trial court has stayed proceedings pending this interlocutory appeal. (R. 312.)
Kmart asserts claims for damages to its leasehold and easement caused by the
taking of the deeded Access. (R. 44-54.) Kmart presumes that FPA will assert claims for
just compensation for the taking of its deeded Access, and for severance damages to the
remainder of the Shopping Center Property caused by the taking.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

For nearly 30 years, Kmart operated a store in the West Point Shopping

Center Property, located at the intersection of 5400 South and Bangerter Highway in
Taylorsville, Utah, pursuant to a lease dated July 23, 1980 (as amended, "Lease"). (R.
88-99.) The Shopping Center Property currently is owned by FPA. (R. 82-87.)
2.

Kmart owned an access easement granted by FPA's predecessor pursuant to

a Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions and Grant of Easements dated October 1,
1980 (the "Declaration"). The Declaration granted Kmart a "mutual, non-exclusive, and

4
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reciprocal easement and right-of-way for passage over and use o f the Common Areas of
the FPA property. (R. 100-26.)
3.-

For many years, Albertson's operated a grocery store as a tenant in the

Shopping Center. Albertson's vacated the space when it discontinued operations in Utah
several years ago. Albertson's lease remained in effect, and was due to expire in May,
2012. (R. 4, 259, 269-69A.)
4.

By the Condemnation Action filed on April 29, 2010, UDOT condemned

the Access granted by Warranty Deed, which provided direct access to the Shopping
Center Property from Bangerter Highway, immediately in front of the Kmart store. (R.
1-12.) For convenience, a copy of an aerial photograph depicting the Shopping Center
and the Access (R. 247) is attached as Addendum A to Kmart's Brief in Opposition.
5.

By taking the Access, UDOT substantially and materially impaired Kmart's

access, causing Kmart's Lease to terminate pursuant to its terms effective June 21, 2010.
Kmart operated the store on a month-to-month basis until March 31, 2011, when it
closed. (R. 235.)
UDOTs Appraisal of the Loss of the Albertson's Lease to FPA
6.

Before filing the Condemnation Action, UDOT commissioned an appraisal

("Appraisal") (R. 249-271 A), which appraised the fair market value of the Access taken

5
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by a "before and after approach."1 (R. 251.) The Appraisal appraised the fair market
value of the Shopping Center Property before the taking at $9.94 million, and after the
taking at $8.69 million. Subtracting the Property's fair market value after the taking from
its value before the taking, the Appraisal appraised the value of the Access at $1.25
million. (R. 268-271 A.)
7.

In appraising the value of the Shopping Center Property after the taking, the

Appraisal assumed that the Access taking would cause Albertson's to terminate its lease
when UDOT closed the Access. The Appraisal assumed, however, that Kmart would
continue in its Lease. (R. 269.)
8.

The Appraisal's appraised value of the Access at $1.25 million rests

entirely on the loss of rental income to FPA from the early termination of the Albertson's
lease—i.e., the rental income that FPA would have enjoyed from the date that UDOT
closed the Access to the expiration of Albertson's lease in May, 2012. The Appraisal did
not calculate the loss of rental income to FPA from termination of the Kmart Lease, or
the damages to the entire Shopping Center Property caused by the Access taking and the
termination of the Kmart Lease. (R. 269A-271A.)

1

The Appraisal explained:

[The] value of the taking (deeded access) is estimated by a before and after
approach where value of the larger parcel before the taking is first
estimated. Value of the property after the taking is then estimated and
deducted from the larger parcel value to arrive at the value of the taking.
The value of the taking comprises the value of the portion taken plus
severance damages, if any, less special benefits, if any.
(R.251.)
6
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9.

The Appraisal did not appraise the damage to Kmart's Lease, easement, and

property interests caused by the Access taking and the termination of the Kmart Lease.
The Appraisal did determine, however, that Kmart's lease rate was $3.75 per sq. ft., and
"concluded" that market rent was $4.50 per sq. ft. (Id. at 21.) Therefore, according to
UDOT's Appraisal, Kmart's Lease had a "bonus value" of at least $0.75 per sq. ft. ($4.50
-$3.75 = $0.75). (R.260A.)
UDOT's Deposit of its Appraised Value for the Benefit of all Owners
10.

Before filing the Condemnation Action, UDOT (i) did not make a good

faith offer to purchase Kmart's property interests pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-505; (ii) did not provide Kmart with the notices specified by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-5-505(2); and (iii) did not provide Kmart with its Appraisal of the property
interests taken or damaged.
11.

In support of its Motion for Order of Occupancy, Pendente Lite, UDOT

deposited into Court the "appraised value of the premises sought to be condemned,
[which] is $1,250,000, with no severance damages . . . . " (R. 22.)
12.

In its Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Proceedings

Pending Interlocutory Appeal, UDOT took the position that it had
deposited $1,250,000 with the Court for the benefit of the defendants in this
action in order to obtain its Order of Occupancy. Aff. of McMillan at ^ 19
and Notice of Deposit docketed May 26, 2010. Defendants are free to
withdraw these funds "as an advance on the just compensation to be
awarded in the proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-510(6)(a).
(R.214.)

7
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Reading its plain language, the trial court correctly held that Utah Code Ann.
§ 51 l(l)(b) requires the trier of fact to separately determine and assess the "value of each
and every separate estate or interest in the property." The trial court correctly rejected
UDOT's assertion that subsection 51 l(l)(a) requires the trier of fact to apportion the
value of the various estates and interests in property from the total value of the property
in gross, and UDOT's assertion that the total amount of just compensation and damages
cannot exceed the total value of the property.
No words in section 511(1) require a trier of fact to apportion just compensation
among the several owners of estates and interests in property, and no words impose any
kind of limitation on the amount of just compensation or damages to be awarded.
UDOT's reading of section 511(1) grafts words and improper meaning onto the plain
statutory language, and ignores subsections (2) through (7) of section 511. Those
subsections specify that the trier of fact is to separately assess and determine each
element of damages, and to separately assess any special benefits. Because Kmart and
FPA seek damages to their respective property interests caused by the Access taking,
those subsections are material to and at the heart of this case. Read in its entirety, section
511 requires the trier of fact to separately assess the value of each estate and interest in
each property, to separately assess the value of each parcel (and each estate and interest
in each parcel), to separately assess each source of damages, and to separately assess any
special benefits.

8
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The trial court also correctly held that Brown conflicts with the plain language of
section 511. Brown never once referenced section 511, or the constitutional principles
and many precedents of this Court that govern the award of just compensation. As this
Court recently reaffirmed, it is "axiomatic that our precedent must yield when it conflicts
with a validly enacted statute." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ^f 37, 694 Utah Adv.
Rep. 25 (citing Gottling v. P.R, Inc., 2002 UT 95 | 7, 61 P.3d 989). Moreover, because
Brown's statements regarding apportionment are dicta, the trial court was not bound to
follow or apply Brown.
Equally important, to the extent that Brown imposes a judicial gloss on the plain
language of section 511, Brown violates a cardinal rule of statutory construction: a statute
must be read to avoid an unconstitutional result. As this Court has held for more than a
century, and has recently reaffirmed in UDOT v. Admiral Beverage, 2011 UT 62, 693
Utah Adv. Rep. 16, a property owner must be placed in as good a position moneywise as
the owner would have occupied but for the taking. Brown's twin statements that the
value of all estates and interests in property must be apportioned from the value of the
entire property in gross, and that just compensation (including damages) to each property
owner cannot exceed the fair market of the entire property, by definition violate these
constitutional principles and precedents. Brown applies only if the just compensation to
all owners in total exceeds the fair market value of the entire property, and therefore
prevents each owner from enjoying full just compensation for property taken or damaged.
Finally, UDOT's assertion that Brown enables UDOT to negotiate voluntary
agreements to purchase property before filing condemnation actions, is a complete non9
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sequiter. There is no nexus at all between the method by which the trier of fact
determines and assesses just compensation at trial, and a condemning authority's prelitigation negotiations with a property owner. As the facts of this case establish, UDOT
could have entered a voluntary agreement with FPA regardless of the method used to
value FPA's interests, and regardless of UDOT's failure to negotiate with Kmart. And
UDOT could not have extinguished or affected Kmart's right to just compensation,
whether or not it reached agreement with FPA. If anything, separate valuation of the
interests of Kmart and FPA would promote the statutory scheme by specifying the
amount of money deposited into court based on the appraised value of each separate
property interest, rather than requiring Kmart and FPA to attempt to apportion the money
between themselves.
For all of these reasons, this Court should affirm the Memorandum Decision of the
trial court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 511(l)(b) REQUIRES THE TRIER OF FACT TO SEPARATELY ASSESS
THE VALUE OF EACH AND EVERY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.
Section 511(1 )(b) clearly and plainly states that the finder of fact must "determine

and assess" the "value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property."
UDOT argues that this plain direction cannot mean what it says, because it would render
subsection (l)(a) superfluous. (Pet. Br. at 7-8.) Subsection 1(a) requires the trier of fact
to assess the "value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements
pertaining to the realty." UDOT argues that, "if the property as a whole served no
10
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limiting function, there would be no need to determine it." (Pet. Br. at 7.) (emphasis
added). UDOT further argues that if "each estate or interest were entitled to be valued
without reference to the gross value of the parcel giving rise to it, there would be no need
to separately value the underlying parcel." (Id. at 8.) (emphasis added).
UDOT's reading of the statutory language is flatly wrong for three reasons. First,
UDOT rewrites subsection 1(a) well beyond its plain language.

As the passages

highlighted above establish, UDOT grafts onto the plain language of subsection 1(a) the
requirement that the "gross value" of the property serve a "limiting function" on just
compensation awards. Nowhere does plain statutory language impose such a cap; the
sole source is this Court's ruling in State Road Comm'n v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1975), which made no reference at all to the plain statutory language, but only to an
A.L.R. digest. {See Section II, infra.) As in Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592,
cited by UDOT (Pet. Br. at 5), UDOT's reading of subsections 1(a) and (b) imposes "an
unreasonable and unworkable construction, and requires [this Court] to infer language
and meaning that does not appear on the face of the statute." 2003 UT 592, ^f 19.
Second, any fair reading of subsection 511(1) shows that its subsections do not
render each other superfluous, but complement and clarify each other.

Again as in

Miller, id., subsections (l)(a) through (l)(c) are "expository," with each subsection
providing "further elucidation" of subsection 511(1). Subsection (l)(a) directs the trier of
fact to determine and assess the value of all property taken, and its improvements.
Subsection (l)(b) applies if there are multiple estates and interests in property, and directs
the trier of fact to determine and assess each separate interest. Subsection (l)(c) applies
11
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if there are multiple parcels, and directs the trier of fact to separately assess each estate
and interest in each parcel UDOT's assertion that the trial court's reading of subsection
(l)(b) renders subsection (l)(a) superfluous proves too much; by the same argument,
subsection (l)(b) would render subsection (l)(c) superfluous, too. In reality, each
subsection provides further meaning and elucidation; one does not destroy any of the
others. See Redecker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[A] statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy
another.") (emphasis added).
The trial court also correctly held that Town of Perry v. Thomas, 22 P.2d 343
(Utah 1933) "confirmed that the general rule of valuing in gross'" is inapplicable in
Utah. (R. 195.) Reading the predecessor statute to subsection (l)(c), Town of Perry held
that each property owner "is entitled to have separately assessed the value of land in
separate ownership and each estate or interest therein . . . ." 33 P.2d at 347. UDOT
attempts to distinguish Town of Perry by asserting that it addressed the "lump-sum
valuation of multiple, individually-owned parcels" (Pet. Br. at 4), but cannot explain why
estates and interests in a single parcel are to be valued separately under subsection (l)(c)
when multiple parcels are taken or damaged, but to be apportioned under subsection
(l)(b) if only a single parcel is taken or damaged. It defies common sense to suggest that
the constitutional method of determining the value of estates and interests in property
varies with a condemning authority's discretionary decision to file a single action against
multiple parcels, or separate actions for each parcel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-507(2)
12
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("All parcels lying in the county and required for the same public use may be included in
the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff

").

Third, UDOT's reading of subsection 511(1) ignores subsections (2) through (7).
These subsections all require the trier of fact to "determine and assess" different kinds of
damages: severance damages to the remainder property (subsection (2)); damages to
property not taken but damaged (subsection (3)); special benefits to the remainder
property created by construction of the improvement (subsection (4)); damages to a water
delivery system (subsection (5)); and crop-loss damages (subsection 6)).
Significantly, subsection (7) requires these damages to be assessed separately:
"[A]s far as practicable compensation shall be assessed for each source of damages
separately." And subsection (4) requires the trier of fact to assess "separately how much
the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or interest in it, will be
benefitted, if at all, by the construction of improvements." (emphasis added).
UDOT ignores the important point that this Condemnation Action involves a
partial taking of a deeded Access, and damages to FPA and to Kmart caused by the
partial taking. Kmart claims damages to its leasehold and to its easement caused by the
taking.2

Presumably, FPA will claim damages to the fee caused by the taking.

Kmart's leasehold and easement constitute protectable property interests, and
Kmart is entitled to just compensation when those interests are taken or damaged. See,
e.g., Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah 1990) (both a lease and an
easement are protectable property interests, as "[a] lessee holding under a valid lease also
has a property interest protected by the takings clause of the constitutional
provisions[.]"); Wasatch Gas Co. v. Bouwhis, 26 P.2d 548 (Utah 1933) (condemnation of
easement over land for gas pipe held "taking" of private property, for which
compensation must be paid).
13
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Subsection (7) plainly requires the trier of fact to determine and assess these damages
separately.3
As UDOT acknowledges, this Court "reads the plain language of the statute as a
whole, and interpret provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapter." (Pet. Br. at 5) (quoting Miller, supra, T| 17). Accord Faux v. Mickelsen,
725 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah 1986) (following the "cardinal rule that the general purpose,
intent or purpose of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts be interpreted as
subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object"). Here, all the subsections of section
511, read in harmony, establish a "manifest object" that the trier of fact separately
determine and assess the fair market values of, and damages and special benefits to, each
separate interest in each parcel of property. Not a single sentence in section 511 fairly
can be read to even suggest that the value of each interest is to be measured by the gross
value of the entire property and apportioned, or that the gross value of the property serves
a "limiting function" or as a "cap" on just compensation or damages to be awarded.
UDOT's assertion (Pet. Br. at 5), that section 511(l)(b) is "susceptible of two
3

UDOT's Appraisal purported to value the Access taken at $1.2 million, with no
severance damages to FPA's remainder property and no damages to Kmart. (R. 21, 25.)
However, the appraisal determined the fair market value of the Access by subtracting the
value of the remainder property from the value of the entire property before the taking.
This is the measure of severance damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(2). See
also UDOT v. Admiral Beverage Corp,, 2011 UT 62,fflf33, 40 & n. 4; Utah Dep't of
Transp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481, 490 (Utah 1979) ("The proper measure of
severance damages to the remainder is the difference between the fair cash market value
before and after the taking."); Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen, 558 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah
1977) (landowner was "entitled to compensation, not only for the market value of the
land directly so affected, but also for severance damages resulting for decreasing the
market value of the remainder of her land," caused by aerial easement).
14
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constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat [its] manifest object," is
wrong.

Because no language in section 511 purports to apportion or to impose a

"limiting function" on just compensation awards, the trial court's reading of section
511(1 )(b) does not conflict with or defeat its "manifest object."
This Court should affirm the Memorandum Decision of the trial court.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT BROWN CONFLICTS
WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 511 AND THE
STATUTORY SCHEME ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE.
UDOT asserts that "Brown sets out the correct standard for calculating

condemnation damages" (Pet. Br. at 9), and that "[n]o subsequent case has cast doubt on
the continued vitality of that longstanding precedent." (Id. at 4.) The first assertion is
contradicted by the trial court's recognition that Brown conflicts with the plain statutory
language for determining condemnation awards. The second assertion is contradicted by
this Court's recent decision in UDOTv, Admiral Beverage Corp,, 2011 UT 62, 693 Utah
Adv. Rep. 16, which, if Brown were controlling, requires this Court to reverse Brown for
the same reasons that, in Admiral Beverage, this Court overruled Ivers v. UDOT, 2007
UT19, 154P.3d802.
A.

Because Brown Conflicts with the Plain Statutory Language, it is
Axiomatic that Brown Must Yield to Section 511.

This Court held in Brown:
The rule is generally recognized . . . that, where there are several
interest or estates in a parcel of land of real estate taken by eminent domain,
a proper method of fixing the value of, or damage to, each interest or estate,
is to determine the value of, or damages to, the property as a whole, and
then to apportion the same among the several owners according to their

15

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

respective interests or estates, rather than to take each interest or estate as a
unit and fix the value thereof or damage thereto separately....
The total of all interests cannot exceed the value of the property as a whole.
531 P.2d at 1295. The sole support for this broad statement was an American Law
Report published at 69 A.L.R. 1263 (1930), and titled: "Are different estates or interests
in real property taken under eminent domain to be valued separately, or, is entire property
to be valued as a unit and the amount apportioned among separate interests."
Brown did not consider, and made no reference at all, to Article I, Section 22 of
the Utah Constitution, to the Utah Eminent Domain Code, (including the section now
codified as section 511), or to any of this Court's longstanding precedents holding that
property owners are entitled to just compensation to the extent of their damages suffered,
see, e.g., Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 11 P. 849, 852 (1904), and to be "put in as
good a position money wise as they would have occupied had their property not been
taken." State ex rel Rd. Comm 'n v. Noble, 305 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1957).
The trial court correctly held that Brown conflicts with the plain language of
section 511. "It is axiomatic that our precedent must yield when it conflicts with a
validly exacted statute." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ^ 37, 694 Utah Adv. Rep.
25 (citing Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95 1j 7, 61 P.3d 989).
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B.

The Trial Court Correctly Disregarded Brown Because its
Statements Regarding Apportionment are Dicta.

The trial court correctly applied section 511 and disregarded Brown for the
additional reason that Brown's statements are dicta, and thus have no controlling or
binding effect. Statements are dicta if they are not necessary or essential to the court's
decision. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Emery County, 702 P.2d 121, 125 (Utah
1985) (language was dictum "in that it was not essential to the resolution of the issue in
the case"); In re Clark's Estate, 354 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah 1960) ("The quoted statement
as found [in the case] was not necessary to the decision of that case and must be
considered dicta."). Of course, dicta is "without binding effect" on future decisions.
State v. Laris, 2 P.2d 243, 251 (Utah 1931) ("[e]very opinion must be read and
considered in light of the facts and in view of the particular question or questions
presented for decision").
Brown's statements as to valuing the property as a whole and thereafter
apportioning separate interests, the total of which cannot exceed the total value of the
property, are dicta. That is, the only issue presented and argued in Brown did not involve
the valuation of the property as a whole followed by apportionment among separate
interests or whether the total value could exceed the whole; nor were those statements
necessary to the ultimate decision. Brown addressed and reversed the trial court solely on
an erroneous jury instruction as to inclusion of severance damages for personal property
located in the store which became obsolete by the taking, as distinguished from fixtures,
which would have been compensable. See Brown, 531 P.2d at 1296 ("This latter part
17
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[instructing as to severance damages for personal property] is clearly erroneous and
undoubtedly caused the jury to give severance damages in an amount greater than that
testified to by the witnesses.").
It is immaterial that Brown additionally raised or opined on the collateral issue of
valuing separate interests with regard to the property's total value within the opinion, or
that all members of the court concurred, as the issue was not before the court and the
statements were wholly unnecessary to deciding the issue actually presented, argued and
decided. At best, the statements served merely to illustrate a "generally recognized rule"
{id. at 1295) in eminent domain law that was not held specifically applicable to Utah or
otherwise expounded on in any manner.

It certainly cannot be read that way in

retrospect, given the ample statutory and case law authority it squarely contradicts.
Indeed, if Brown's statements regarding apportionment were central or necessary to the
ruling, Brown presumably would have addressed competing arguments or contrary rules.
Because those statements are dicta, the trial court correctly disregarded Brown and
applied the plain language of section 511.
C.

To the Extent that Brown is Controlling and Section 511(1) is
Ambiguous, it Must be Construed to Avoid the Inherent
Constitutional Conflict Reaffirmed in Admiral Beverage.

UDOT's assertion that Brown is consistent with subsection 511(1) (Pet. Br. at 11)
makes no mention of another rule of statutory construction that has particular application
here: As this Court has emphasized, "we have a duty to construe a statute whenever
possible so as to effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional
conflicts or infirmities." In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, \ 23, 1 P.3d 1074
18
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(quoting State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989)). See also Marion Energy, Inc. v.
KFJ Ranch Partnership, 2011 UT 50, *[f 31 ("[W]e strictly construe any ambiguity in
statutory language purporting to grant the power of eminent domain in favor of the
property owner and against the condemning authority").4
To the extent that Brown is controlling, and that section 511(1) is ambiguous, this
Court should overrule Brown for the same reasons that it overruled hers v. UDOT, 2007
UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, in Admiral Beverage.
First, Brown, like hers, "contravenes [this Court's] long-standing precedent
holding that constitutional requirements are satisfied only when a property owner is made
whole by placing him in as good a position as he would have occupied but for the
taking," and "long-standing precedent allowing recovery for all damages caused by a
taking." Admiral Beverage, 2011 UT 62, ^ 28. In Admiral Beverage, this Court stated:
Once a landowner demonstrates that a protectable property interest
"has been taken or damaged by government action," Harold Selman, 2011
UT 18, ^[ 23 (internal quotation marks omitted), the landowner is entitled to
"just compensation," UTAH CONST, art. I, § 22. And it is well established
that when the requirement of "just compensation" is triggered, the
landowner is entitled to compensation "to the extent of the damages
suffered." Stockdale, 11 P. at 852. This has been interpreted to require
"'that the owners must be put in as good a position moneywise as they
would have occupied had their property not been taken.'" City ofHildale v.
Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ^ 19, 28 P.3d 697(quoting State ex rel Rd Comm 'n v.
Noble, 305 P.2d 495, 497 (Utahl957)); see also Seaboard Air Line Ry Co.
Although Marion Energy expressly addressed ambiguity in a statute purporting
to grant the power of eminent domain, Kmart submits that its reasoning should extend to
section 511, and the principle that a statute should be construed to avoid constitutional
conflict or infirmity. Just as the statute purporting to grant the power of eminent domain
derogates an owner's property rights, UDOT's reading of section 511 (ignored in Brown),
derogates an owner's constitutional right to full damages and just compensation for a
taking.
19
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v. United States, 261 U.S. 299,304 (1923) ("[T]he owner shall be put in as
good position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property had not
been taken."). And "[t]he constitutional requirement of just compensation
derives 'as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it
does from technical concepts of property law.'" Utah State Rd. Comm'n v.
Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) (quoting United States v. Fuller,
409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973)). "[T]o be fair and just, [compensation] must
reflect the fair value of the land to the landowner." Id. Compensation
meets this standard of fairness when it makes the landowner financially
whole by placing him in the position he would have occupied were his
property not taken. See id.; see also Seaboard, 261 U.S. at 304.
Id.
By definition, Brown conflicts with these bedrock constitutional principles.
Requiring property to be valued in gross, with compensation to be apportioned among the
owners of all estates and interests in the property, and without regard to valuation of the
separate interests of each owner or the separate damages suffered by each owner, means
that each owner will not be placed in a good of a position as the owner would have been
but for the taking or damage. By definition, Brown's dictum that "the total of all interests
cannot exceed the value of the property as a whole," comes into play only if the just
compensation required to make all owners whole, exceeds the value of the property in
gross. Only when the dictum conflicts with the constitutional right to just compensation
does it affect the just compensation awarded, by placing a cap on the award.
Here UDOT has appraised the value of the entire property before the taking at
$9.4 million, and after the taking at $8.69 million, with the value of the Access at $1.25
million. If, pursuant to the trial court's ruling, the trier of fact at trial separately assesses
and determines the just compensation to be awarded to FPA and Kmart, the awards may
or may not exceed $9.4 million, or whatever other value the trier of fact determines for
20
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the property in gross before the taking. If the awards do not exceed the value of the
property in gross, then Brown does not apply. If the awards exceed the value of the
property in gross, then applying Brown conflicts with the constitutional principles that
each property owner must be compensated for all damages suffered, and placed in as
good a position as each would have occupied but for the taking.
Second, Brown, like Ivers, "runs afoul of the statutory framework that the
legislature has put in place for assessing severance damages," and just compensation. As
in Ivers, UDOT could take property without paying compensation for all property taken
or damaged. Admiral Beverage, supra,fflf32, 34. (See also, Section I, supra.)
Third, overruling Brown, like Ivers, will cause "more good than harm." Admiral
Beverage, supra, <f 36. For the reasons stated in the following Section, overruling Brown
not only will ensure that each property owner will be awarded full compensation and
damages, but will promote several policies embodied in the Eminent Domain Code.
To the extent that Brown is controlling, this Court therefore should overrule
Brown and affirm the Memorandum Decision of the trial court.
III.

UDOT'S ASSERTION THAT SEPARATE VALUATION WOULD
FRUSTRATE THE STATUTORY SCHEME IS ILLOGICAL; IF
ANYTHING, IT WOULD PROMOTE THE STATUTORY SCHEME.
UDOT asserts that separate valuation of each estate or interest by the trier of fact

would frustrate the statutory scheme, because it would render "futile" a condemning
authority's "statutorily mandated negotiations" with the property owner. UDOT argues
that if the "compensation were due to each interest holder, unconstrained by the
property's value in gross, . . . the owner's agreement to a sales price could not resolve
21
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any issues of additional compensation due other interest holders." (Pet. Br. at 4.)
"[H]olders of subsidiary interests would still have potential unsatisfied claims against the
condemnor that could thwart a negotiated purchase." (Id. at 8.)
The assertion is illogical, and a red herring. There is no nexus at all between the
assessment of just compensation by the trier of fact, and a condemning authority's duty to
negotiate with the owner to purchase property before filing a condemnation action. A
condemning authority must negotiate with each "property owner" whose property it
intends to acquire. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(l). That duty exists whether or not
the trier of fact assesses the value of each property owner's interest separately, or
apportions it from the value in gross. Contrary to UDOT's assertion, UDOT cannot
extinguish "potential unsatisfied claims" (Pet. Br. at 8) by negotiating a voluntary
agreement with the fee owner, because every owner whose property is taken or damaged
obviously is entitled to just compensation.
The circumstances here demonstrate the fallacy of UDOT's assertion. Before
filing this Condemnation Action, UDOT unsuccessfully negotiated with FPA, offering
"at least" the appraised value of $1.25 million. (R. 21, 25.) If FPA had accepted the
offer, however, Kmart still would have had its "unsatisfied claim" for just compensation,
and UDOT still would have filed this Condemnation Action, but without FPA as a party.5
To avoid litigation altogether, UDOT would have had to negotiate a separate agreement
with Kmart. If anything, valuing FPA's and Kmart's interests separately would increase
5

At the very minimum, if UDOT had continued to attempt to ignore Kmart
altogether, UDOT would have been a defendant in an action by Kmart for the taking or
damaging of its property interests.
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the likelihood of successful pre-filing negotiations. As it is, UDOT required FPA to
apportion the $1.25 million offer with Kmart, which effectively ensured the futility of the
negotiations.
Further, requiring FPA and Kmart to apportion the $1.25 million between
themselves effectively nullifies the statutory right of a property owner to withdraw
money deposited into court as a condition precedent to an order of occupancy. Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-510(3)(a) requires a condemning authority, as a condition precedent
to occupancy during the litigation, to file with the clerk of court a "sum equal to the
condemning authority's appraised valuation."

Subsection 6(a) authorizes the property

owner to apply to the court to withdraw the money, as an advance payment of the just
compensation ultimately to be awarded. The purpose of subsection 6(a) is to ensure that
the property owner has the use and enjoyment of the proceeds once it is deprived of the
use and enjoyment of its property.
Here, in support of its Motion for Occupancy Pendente Lite, UDOT deposited
$1.25 million with the clerk of court. UDOT has stated repeatedly that this $1.25 million
is available to both Kmart and FPA "to withdraw at any time without prejudice to a claim
for additional compensation at trial." (Statement of Facts, supra, ^ 12.)
By forcing FPA and Kmart to apportion between themselves the $1.25 million,
UDOT has effectively nullified each property owner's statutory right to withdraw the
funds deposited with the court. If a condemning authority were to value each owner's
interest separately, each owner could make an independent decision whether or not to
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withdraw the funds deposited for its interest. Separate valuation does not frustrate the
statutory scheme, but promotes it.
For these same reasons, "more good than harm," Admiral Beverage, supra, ^ 16,
would result if this Court overrules Brown.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly held that Utah Code Ann § 78B-5-511(l)(b) requires the
trier of fact to separately determine and assess the value of each estate and interest in
property taken or damaged. The trial court correctly held that State ex rel Rd. Comm 'n.
v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975) {"Brown"), conflicts with Utah Code Ann. § 78B6-511(1 )(a), and effectively would nullify the statute if applied. This Court should affirm
the trial court for the reasons stated in its Memorandum Decision, and for the additional
reasons stated in this Brief in Opposition: (i) the statements in Brown are dicta, properly
disregarded by the trial court, or the (ii) statements conflict with the long-standing
constitutional principles recently reaffirmed by this Court in UDOT v. Admiral Beverage
Corp., 2011 UT 62, 693 Utah Adv. Rep. 16.
Dated this 23rd day of November 2011.
CLYDE-SNOW & SESSIONS
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